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Forced Migrants, Media, and Securitization: Making 
Sense of the Changing Representations of Transit 
Asylum Seekers in Indonesian Print Media1 
 
Antony Lee Kompas Newspaper, Indonesia 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper aims to explain how and why the representations of transit 
forced migrants in Indonesian major print media had significantly shifted 
in two timespans: (1) during the arrivals of the Indochinese refugees in 
1975-1996 and (2) in the period of the new generations of refugees from 
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries in 1997-2013. Using media 
content analysis of 216 news articles from three major print media in 
Indonesia, this study has found out that the Indochinese refugees were 
given positive labels and they were mainly discussed in connection with the 
non-security themes. In contrast, the new generations of forced migrants 
were portrayed negatively, given labels such as ‘illegal immigrants’ and 
they were framed as security threats. Grounded within Securitization 
Theory, this paper thus argues that the changing representations were 
likely caused by the securitizing moves made by specialized agencies in 
Indonesia. 
Key words: transit forced migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, media 
representations, Securitization Theory, Indonesia 
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Introduction 
In the midst of the Indochinese 
refugee crisis in July 1979, the Indonesian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Mochtar 
Kusumaatmadja when interviewed by 
reporters said, ‚if ASEAN countries refuse 
to provide protection for refugees then the 
third countries will use it as an excuse for 
not receiving the refugees‛ (Kompas, 14 July 
1979). The minister used the term ‘refugees’ 
to represent people who flee their home 
country due to political instability and 
conflict. In line with this label, the 
government also discussed the issue of 
protection. Decades later, commenting on 
refugees stranded at the sea border between 
Indonesia and Australia – which created 
diplomatic tension between the two states – 
the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Hasan Wirajuda said, ‚They are illegal 
immigrants. Should we let them come in, 
even when our law does not allow it?‛ 
(Tempo magazine, 9 September 2001). Unlike 
the first statement, the second statement 
shows how the recent forced migrants were 
labeled as ‘illegal immigrants’. Thus, their 
attempt to anchor their boats in Indonesian 
soil should be prohibited. The changes in 
the way the forced migrants are discussed 
within those two timespans are very 
striking, which consequently leads to 
questions of how and why the changes 
happened? 
How immigrants are perceived in 
the receiving or transit countries has 
become a central issue in the academic 
world as well as in the realm of 
immigration policy. Categorizing 
immigrants contributes to different 
treatments among them as the different 
terms have social and political implications 
for people who are labeled within those 
categorizations (Brun, 2010, pp. 337-355). 
Moreover, ‘refugees’ and ‘asylum seekers’ 
have different meanings compared to 
‘illegal migrants’, with the last term usually 
associated with crimes (Koser, 2006, p. 44). 
Previous studies on how refugees 
and asylum seekers are perceived 
negatively by hosting countries have been 
conducted mainly in relation to Western 
countries. Those studies predominantly 
discuss how media and government 
represent refugees and asylum seekers 
negatively – as a security threat (Esses, 
Medianu & Lawson, 2013, pp. 518-536; 
Gilbert, 2013, pp. 827-843). KhosraviNik 
(2009) shows that the representations of 
refugees and asylum seekers can change in 
different socio-historical settings, though he 
does not intend to explain the crucial 
problem of why representations of forced 
migrants change. Studying the changes can 
contribute to knowledge on the possible 
socio-political drives behind the changes, 
thus providing a more comprehensive 
picture on the nexus between media 
representations and transit forced migrants. 
This paper will try to fill this gap not 
only by analyzing how the representations 
have changed but also by seeking 
explanations on the causes of these changes. 
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Additionally, this study will also fill out 
another research gap, which is the 
representation of forced migrants in a 
transit state – since issues of border 
controls, asylum seekers management, and 
immigration policies’ transfers from 
Australia to Indonesia have otherwise been 
dominating studies on refugees and asylum 
seekers in Indonesia (Missbach, 2013, pp. 
281-306; Kneebone, 2014, pp. 596-618; 
Nethery & Gordyn, 2014, pp. 177-193). 
This paper discusses how transit 
forced migrants2 were portrayed differently 
in Indonesian print media within two 
different socio-political settings – during the 
arrivals of Indochinese migrants in 1975-
1996 and during the influxes of new 
generations of international migrants in 
1997-2013. This study uses media content 
analysis in order to see the patterns of 
forced migrants’ representations. The 
results show that the forced migrants were 
portrayed differently. Indochinese migrants 
were labeled mainly with the positive term 
such as refugees, while the new generations 
of refugees were portrayed with more 
                                                           
2 The transit forced migrants in the context of this 
paper means that the migrants did not actually intend 
to stay in Indonesia, but rather used Indonesia as a 
stepping-stone while awaiting their resettlement in a 
developed country, such as Australia. Additionally, 
Indonesia still has not ratified the 1951 United 
Nations Convention on Refugees, which means that 
the Indonesian government will not grant refugee 
status for foreign applicants and also will not offer 
permanent settlements for refugees. However, the 
Indonesian government allows United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to open an 
office in Indonesia and take care of refugees’ 
applications. 
negative labels, such as illegal immigrants. 
Securitization Theory is utilized in order to 
shed some light on the possible 
explanations behind the changing 
representations. 
The paper is structured as follows. 
The first part provides a brief explanation 
on the arrivals of international forced 
migrant in Indonesia. The second part 
discusses the theoretical framework of this 
study, which is followed by a section 
discussing methods and data collections. 
The fourth part discusses the research 
result, while the fifth part is discussion 
section that will be followed by the last 
section – conclusion. 
International Transit Refugees in 
Indonesia 
The end of Vietnam War in 1975 was 
marked by the victory of the communist 
regime that caused massive outflows of 
Vietnamese-Chinese descendants who 
resisted the communist ideology. Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia were three 
countries in Southeast Asia that received the 
biggest number of Vietnamese refugees (see 
Table 1). Those countries were considered a 
transit location for the refugees who 
intended to stay in developed countries. 
According to an Indonesian historian, Asvi 
Marwan Adam, the inflows of Indochinese 
refugees to Indonesia can be divided into 
three periods (Swastiwi, 2012). First, the 
period of 1975-1978, which was marked by 
the use of refugee camps on several 
Indonesian islands. Second, the period of 
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1979-1989 which was marked by the 
establishment of a refugee camp on Galang 
Island. Additionally, this period was also 
characterized by the leniency in granting 
refugee status. Lastly, the period of 1989-
1996, where forced migrants had to face 
stricter screening processes. Missbach (2013, 
p. 292) notes that after June 1989, refugee 
status, while initially granted to all of the 
Indochinese forced migrants, started to 
become assessed on an individual basis. In 
this sense, each asylum seeker had to 
provide evidence of his/her claim. A person 
who failed to provide substantial evidence 
would face repatriation. 
The first group of Indochinese 
forced migrants that used Indonesia as 
transit country was recorded on 19th May 
1975, when a group of 92 people arrived 
and then continued their journey to 
Singapore (Fandik, 2013). On 22 May 1975, a 
boat that carried 25 refugees anchored at 
North Natuna Island, Indonesia 
(Ismayawati, 2013). In the first quarter of 
1979, the arrival of refugees to Indonesia 
rocketed to about 40,000 people. In 
comparison, however, the number of 
Indochinese refugees in Indonesia was a 
mere 2,800 people in 1978 (Ismayawati, 
2013). 
 
Table 1. Indochinese Refugees’ Arrivals by Boat in Countries of First Asylum 1975-1995 
Countries 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1995 Accumulation 
Malaysia 124,103 76,205 52,860 1,327 254,495 
Hong Kong 79,906 28,975 59,518 27,434 195,833 
Indonesia 51,156 36,208 19,070 15,274 121,708 
Thailand* 25,723 52,468 29,850 9,280 117,321 
Others 30,538 48,139 25,200 3,076 106,953 
Total 311,426 241,995 186,498 56,391 796,310 
Source: UNHCR (2000: 98) 
*Thailand received higher overland Indochinese refugees that reached 640,246 people in total from 1975-
1995 
 
During the same year, the 
Indonesian government also offered Galang 
Island as a refugee processing camp. The 
idea was warmly welcomed by those states 
in the international community who ended 
up donating money for the establishment 
and operational costs of the processing 
camp. This movement resulted in the 
international community applauding the 
‘humanistic’ approach of the Indonesian 
government towards the transit forced 
migrants (Kompas, 19 June 1996). Initially, 
Galang Island Refugees´ Camp was 
proposed to only last for 2-3 years from the 
first time it was established in 1979 (Kompas, 
24 July 1981). However, it took 17 years 
before the Indonesian government closed 
the camp in August 1996. From the 121,708 
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refugees using Indonesia as transit location, 
111,876 of them were resettled in third 
countries – with the vast majority of the 
refugees being resettled in the USA 
(Ismayawati, 2013). 
Not too long after having dealt with 
the influx episode of the Indochinese forced 
migrants, Indonesia started to receive new 
generations of forced migrants who mainly 
came from some countries in the Middle 
East, Central Asia, and South Asia, such as 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. The 
first inflow of forced migrants from 
Afghanistan and Iran that arrived in 
Indonesia was recorded in 1996, 12 of which 
traveled by air (Missbach, 2013). 
Unlike the Indochinese refugees 
who gained widespread public attention 
within Indonesia due to their significant 
volume in 1979, the new waves of forced 
migrants only began receiving attention 
after the MV Tampa incident at the end of 
August 2001. The Australian conservative 
government rejected a request by MV 
Tampa – a Norwegian ship – to dock in 
Australia. This was due to the ship having 
rescued 438 forced migrants that sought for 
an asylum in Australia. These migrants 
were initially onboard of an Indonesian ship 
that had sunk in the sea (McKay et al., 2011, 
pp. 607-626). This incident created 
diplomatic tension between Australia and 
Indonesia because both countries refused to 
receive the forced migrants. 
 
Table 2. Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Indonesia 2006-2013 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Refugees 301 315 369 798 811 1,006 1,819 3,206 
Asylum Seekers 265 211 353 1,769 2,071 3,233 6,126 7,110 
Returned Refugees 0 0 1 311 0 0 35 0 
Others 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
People on Concern 566 526 726 2,878 2,882 4,239 7,980 10,316 
Source: UNHCR (2007-2014) 
 
Unlike the Indochinese refugees 
who were accommodated on Galang Island, 
the ‘new generations’ of forced migrants 
live in several cities in Indonesia. Some of 
them have to stay in immigration detention 
centers while others can stay in cheap hotels 
or rent rooms or houses from local 
residents. The majority of forced migrants 
that are allowed to live in open detention 
centers stay in Bogor, West Java, in Riau, 
Sumatera Island, or in Makassar, Sulawesi 
Island. The International Organization for 
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Migration (IOM) provides funding for food 
for refugees and asylum seekers who are 
detained in immigration detention centers 
at a cost of IDR 15,000-25,000 (USD 1.5 to 
2.5) per person per day (Nethery et al., 2012, 
p. 102). 
Forced migrants living outside the 
immigration detention center also get a 
monthly living allowance from the IOM or 
from other international organizations. 
Refugees and asylum seekers have to sign a 
certificate declaring their compliance before 
they are allowed to live outside 
immigration detention centers. The 
declaration consists of five points, 
including: ‚the refugees should stay within 
specific area designated by the Directorate 
General of Immigration; refugees are not 
allowed to be at the airport or seaport 
unless accompanied by an immigration 
officer, *…+ and refugees should report to 
Immigration every two weeks for purposes 
of registering their presence‛ (Peraturan 
Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi Nomor IMI-
1489.UM.08.05, 2010). 
Theoretical Frameworks 
This section discusses the nexus 
between media representations and 
securitization of transit forced migrants. 
Establishing the link between those issues is 
critical in order to provide a theoretical 
foundation to answer the questions of: how 
and why the portrayal of forced migrants in 
Indonesian major print media was different 
within two different time spans. This 
section is divided into two correlated parts. 
The first part explains media representation 
theory that provides an explanation on 
what media representation means and how 
this, in turn, affects the forced migrants’ 
changing portrayals in media. The second 
part discusses Securitization Theory: key 
concepts, and how this theory can be useful 
in this study. 
Media Representations 
The way media portrays social 
groups, whether in connection with their 
sexes, races, religions or origins, is the 
primary concern of media representation 
theory (Levinsen & Wien, 2011). According 
to Chavez (2001), media representation is 
closely connected to the construction of 
meaning. Referring to Hall’s notion of 
representation, he underlines that people 
‚use symbols to communicate, or represent 
what we want to say about our feelings, 
beliefs, concept, plans, etc‛ (Chavez, 2001, 
p. 34). In this sense, the news articles do not 
merely consist of passive or neutral symbols 
or words; rather, they actively produce and 
convey ‘messages’. How media represent 
forced migrants has implications on the 
public perception of who forced migrants 
and thus, how to treat them. 
On the one hand, public ‚discourse‛ 
influences media; on the other hand, media, 
in turn, influences the public through its 
role in reconstructing and developing 
‚discourse‛ (Petersson, 2006, p. 41). The 
former argument is in line with Geraghty’s 
(2000, p. 368) point of view on the 
importance of the media´s role in making 
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‚realistic representations‛. Geraghty 
furthermore argues that the representations 
will only work when they go along with the 
audience’s understanding of the object 
being represented. In a very extreme 
example, when the media represent a 
pigeon as a dangerous and deadly animal, 
the audience might refuse to accept those 
representations if society, in general, 
perceives the pigeon as a friendly and 
adorable animal. However, when the 
audience, hypothetically speaking, already 
believes in the possibility of the pigeon as a 
vector of avian influenza – a deadly virus – 
they might accept the representations of the 
pigeon as a dangerous animal. 
Media representations of a 
particular social group do not reflect the 
‚true nature‛ of the group being portrayed 
since media representations are inevitable 
social constructions. Moreover, Edgar and 
Sedgwick (2002) argue that representations 
have nothing to do with the interests of the 
represented groups or how the groups 
expect to be portrayed. A group, according 
to these scholars, "can be represented in a 
manner that might be conceived as 
stereotyping them" (Edgar & Sedgwick, 
2002, p. 339). This argument fits well into 
the context of transit forced migrants. It is 
not in the interests of forced migrants to be 
represented as ‘outsiders’ or ‘illegal 
immigrants’. Instead, those representations 
are put forth as stereotypes that might 
jeopardize migrants’ interests. Therefore, 
what triggers media to represent something 
as they represent it? Does it reflect society’s 
understanding of certain realities? 
Krzyzanowski and Wodak (2009) as 
cited in Busch and Krzyzanowski (2012, p. 
279) argue that several studies have shown 
the connection between media 
representations and political agenda on the 
issue of migration and asylum seekers. The 
argument is based on the concept of ‚chain 
of recontextualizations‛ in which the media 
and politics have dual directional relations. 
First, political discourses are taken by 
media through politicians’ statements or 
speeches. Second, discourses in the media 
are used by politicians (Bernstein, 1990; 
Wodak, 2000; cited in Busch & 
Krzyzanowski, 2012, p. 279). 
Securitization Theory 
The previous section in this part has 
led to two understandings: what is 
represented in the media is the construction 
of reality, and the media representations 
can arguably be influenced by political 
agendas which can construct an issue as a 
security problem. In that regard, 
Securitization Theory is helpful for this 
study in two ways: (1) it enables one to 
situate the issue of transit forced migrants 
in the realm of either security or non-
security, and (2) it allows one to identify 
when an issue has or has not been 
securitized. 
Securitization has become one of the 
prominent theories of security studies in the 
last few decades. This theory is closely 
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associated with a group of scholars referred 
to as the ‘Copenhagen School’, which 
consists of Buzan, Waever, and several 
others (Columba & Vaughan-Williams, 
2010, p. 75). The theory provides for the 
possibility of widening the concept of 
security. This is possible because 
Securitization Theory does not subscribe to 
the understanding of security by 
objectivist’s who assumes the existence of 
‚objective‛ threats is outside of their social 
construction. For several decades, the 
realist-traditionalist’s understanding of 
security has dominated security studies. 
This view presupposes the state as the most 
important aspect of security and thus 
situates the military sector as the main 
response to security concerns (Sheehan, 
2005). 
In contrast, Securitization Theory – 
grounded in a constructivist paradigm – 
challenges the objectivist understanding of 
security by arguing that security is socially 
constructed. However, the Copenhagen 
School does not offer a subjective 
construction of security that lies upon 
personal perspectives of threats because this 
might result in a radical relativist’s way of 
understanding security. Instead, the 
Copenhagen School proposes a middle 
ground between objective-positivist and 
subjective-relativist. They highlight an 
‚inter-subjective process‛ of the 
construction of security (Buzan et al., 1998, 
p. 30). According to Hansen (2000, p. 288), 
the ‚inter-subjective‛ understanding paves 
the way for the widening of the security 
concept but is also able to hinder ‚unlimited 
expansion‛ that can make the security 
concept become meaningless. 
Before further discussing the key 
concepts of Securitization Theory, I would 
like to highlight a crucial concept from the 
Copenhagen School that is central to this 
paper, which is ‚the spectrum of public 
issues‛. According to Buzan et al. (1998), 
public issues can be understood from a 
spectrum consisting of non-politicized, 
politicized, and securitized issues. The first 
point refers to an issue that is not debated 
publicly and therefore, the state has no 
involvement in the issue. When the issue is 
politicized, the state will have a role in it 
and the issue will receive public attention, 
which will then lead  to  debate. A 
securitized issue means that the issue is 
perceived as an existential threat to a 
particular object. Thus, an extraordinary 
response is employed (Buzan et al., 1998, 
pp. 23-24). 
Concerning the process of how an 
issue becomes a security concern, Ole 
Waever (1995, p. 55) argues that ‚security is 
not of interest as a sign that refers to 
something more real: the utterance itself is 
the act‛. His claim is based on the concept 
stating that security could be regarded as 
speech acts, where declaring something as a 
security issue is an act. It means that an 
issue or social groups can be securitized if 
actors enunciate to certain audiences that 
the intended issue poses an existential 
threat to one or more particular referent 
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objects and that therefore, in order to 
handle the issue, extraordinary measures 
need to be taken immediately (Waever, 
1995, p. 55; Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21). It is the 
dynamics of those components: actors, 
existential threats, referent objects, 
extraordinary measure, and audiences that 
are central to Securitization Theory. An 
existential threat generates a sense of 
urgency and therefore locates an issue on 
the top of the priority list that needs to be 
handled immediately, often using unusual 
measures. The securitization can only work 
if the object being presented is currently 
under threat or is considered as something 
fundamentally important (Buzan et al., 
1998). 
However, ‘speech acts’ – the 
epistemology of Securitization Theory – has 
mainly become the object of criticism by 
other scholars working with the widening 
of the security concept. Balzacq (2005, p. 
181) claims that speech acts focus too much 
on the ‚internal‛ nature of threats, but 
negate ‚external threats‛ that have nothing 
to do with the discursive strategy of speech 
acts.  In contrast, he argues that language 
influences people´s perception of reality, 
but language does not construct it. In other 
words, language plays a role in the 
construction of meaning, but it is not the 
only thing that matters. His epistemological 
stance allegedly differs from that of the 
Copenhagen School, which Buzan et al. 
(1998, p. 204) claim as ‚radically 
constructivist‛. Drawing upon the case of 
securitization of migration in Greece, 
Karyotis (2012) underlines a relatively 
similar problem on the inability of the 
‘speech acts’ approach to illuminate the 
non-discursive process of the securitization 
of migration. As the consequence, he argues 
that speech acts fail ‚to capture the full 
dynamic of the complex process through 
which issues are raised on the security 
agenda‛ (Karyotis, 2012, p. 392). 
Huysmans (2000) provides a suitable 
alternative theory that can illuminate the 
‚complex process‛ of the securitization of 
migration presented in this paper. 
Huysmans highlights that ‘speech acts’ can 
impose securitization, but it is not the only 
possible way. Securitization can also be 
imposed through ‚restrictive policy and 
policing‛ (Huysmans, 2000, p. 751). The 
latter argument is developed to tackle the 
‚weak‛ point of the discursive approach – 
that speech acts that only focus on political 
speeches in the public domain inevitably 
belittle the less visible, but still influential, 
works of ‚security experts‛, such as the 
police (Huysmans, 2006, p. 8). 
In that context, I find the concept of 
‚security continuum‛ that Huysmans 
developed from Didier Bigo to be useful for 
this paper. Security continuum is ‚an 
institutionalized mode of policymaking that 
allows for the transfer of the security 
connotations of terrorism, drug trafficking 
and money-laundering to the area of 
migration,‛ (Husymans, 2000, p. 760; 
Huysmans, 2006, p. 71). Huysmans further 
explains that the transfer of security concern 
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to the migration issue will work in the way 
that it would change people’s perception on 
the initial meaning of migration issue or 
refugees´ issue. Hammerstad (2014, pp. 268-
269) also shares a similar idea to Huysmans 
by arguing that in many cases, refugees and 
asylum seekers are not directly referred to 
as ‚threats or enemies‛, but ‚they were 
lumped together with other more 
traditional scary trends such as 
international crime‛. In this paper, I include 
other types of crimes that, according to 
previous studies, are regularly connected to 
migrants, such as people smuggling, arms 
smuggling, human trafficking, global 
mafias, and arms smuggling (Sorensen, 
2012; Curley, 2008). 
In a nutshell, the theory is useful for 
this study in two ways. First, almost all 
public issues can be securitized, thus the 
way the media represent refugees and 
asylum seekers can contribute to 
securitization or it can also be a tool to 
analyze whether an issue is securitized or is 
not. Second, securitization can take the form 
of direct labeling to migrants as existential 
threats (Buzan et al., 1998). It can also take 
the form of lumping the migration issue 
together with frightening crimes 
(Hammerstad, 2014). 
Methods and Data Collections 
This study uses media content 
analysis as an analyzing tool. Media content 
analysis is a ‚message-centered 
methodology‛ (Neuendorf, 2002, p. 9, cited 
in Macnamara, 2005, p. 1) that is useful in 
the analysis of a broad range of texts, from 
the contents of newspapers or 
newsmagazines to the content of films and 
television programs (Macnamara, 2005, p. 
1). Hansen et al. (1998, p. 95) argue that this 
method is ‚by definition a quantitative 
method‛ due to its emphasis on identifying 
and counting topics or communication 
symbols in texts under scrutiny.  This 
method is chosen for this study because it 
provides patterns of media portrayal over 
time on particular issues in large corpuses 
(Berelson, 1952; Gunter, 2000, cited in 
Levinsen & Wien, 2011, p. 842). In this 
sense, content analysis is used to establish 
representation patterns of the transit forced 
migrants in Indonesian major print media 
over the period of 38 years. 
Before I designed my research, I first 
conducted a pilot test with small samples. 
This pilot test was intended to see whether 
this study is worth doing in the first place. 
The samples were Kompas newspaper 
articles with the distribution of 54 articles 
representing the period of the Indochinese 
refugees’ arrivals, and 63 articles 
representing the period of the new 
generations of forced migrants. In that 
sense, the results shall be the basis for the 
overall design of this research. 
In utilizing content analysis, this 
study subscribes to the procedure of 
Hansen et al. (1998, p. 98-99); (1) 
formulating research questions, (2) choosing 
samples, (3) constructing categories, (4) 
developing coding schedule, (5) testing the 
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coding schedule in small scale and 
readjusting it, and (6) conducting the full 
coding and thus analyzing the data. All of 
the steps are performed in a sequential 
order. The categories and the coding 
schedule are developed in parallel to one 
another by consulting to the pilot study, the 
literature review and also to the theoretical 
framework. 
The news samples were taken from 
three prominent and influential media 
houses in Indonesia. Two of them are 
newspapers, namely Kompas and Tempo, 
while the other one is a newsmagazine 
named Tempo. There are some reasons as to 
why these three print media sources were 
chosen. First, two out of the three media 
sources were established before the arrivals 
of Indochinese refugees in 1975. Kompas 
newspaper was founded in 1965 while 
Tempo magazine was established in 1971. 
Tempo newspaper was established in 2001, 
but since it is under similar editorial 
management, it can be argued that the 
reports of Tempo magazine during the 
arrival of Indochinese refugees are 
somewhat comparable to the news articles 
of Tempo newspaper. This enables this study 
to access continuous reports on refugees 
from different time spans. Second, these 
three media sources are also the highest 
ranked Indonesian media in terms of their 
circulation. Additionally, those media also 
have an expansive national distribution, as 
well as nation-wide news coverage. Third, 
these media houses have high reputations 
for their good quality in Indonesia. 
When the selection of media sources 
and time periods were completed, the next 
step taken was to select news samples in 
accordance with ‚relevant content‛ (Hansen 
et al., 1998, p. 104). The samples were 
chosen through relevant sampling design, 
with the use of certain keywords. Internal 
search engines from Kompas and Tempo 
were used since Indonesia does not have an 
integrated media archive. Searching for 
articles on Vietnamese refugees, the 
keyword combinations used were those of 
pengungsi (refugees), Vietnam, imigran gelap 
(illegal immigrants), Indocina (Indochinese). 
For the recent waves of refugees, the 
keywords were imigran gelap (illegal 
immigrants), transit, Indonesia, pengungsi 
(refugees), suaka (asylum). 
As many as 256 entries were found 
in the data selection through relevant 
keywords for the Indochinese refugees and 
298 entries for the time after the arrival of 
Indochinese refugees. In order to find 
samples that serve the purpose of this 
research, all of those articles were read and 
reselected. For the articles that only 
mentioned Indonesia, but no Indonesian 
sources were mentioned, the items were 
omitted. In total, there were 216 relevant 
samples3 that were coded for this study, 
with distributions of 129 articles from 
Kompas newspaper, 37 articles from Tempo 
magazine, and 50 articles from Tempo 
                                                           
3 Other studies that used media content analysis had 
various numbers of samples, ranging from 203 articles 
(Nolan et al., 2011) to 1,174 articles (Levinsen & Wien, 
2011). 
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newspaper. For the articles distribution 
which was based upon the time span, 123 
articles were published in time span of new 
waves of forced migrants (1997-2013), while 
93 articles were published during the 
Indochinese forced migrants’ arrival (1975-
1996). 
Results 
The results show that the way transit 
forced immigrants were labeled and 
discussed in one period evidently changed 
in the other. The content analysis of the 
labels was conducted at the level of the 
entire article. Each article was only coded 
once. During the period of the arrival of the 
Indochinese refugees, the vast majority of 
the sample used positive labels. The label of 
‘refugees’ appeared in 72 percent of the 
news samples. In total, the combination of 
positive representations such as ‘refugees’, 
‘mix-positive’ and ‘boat people’ reached 89 
percent. Mix-positive contains a 
combination of two or more of the 
positively connoted labels, such as 
‘refugees’, ‘boat people’,4 and ‘asylum 
seekers’. The use of negative terms, such as 
‘illegal immigrants’, was very low. There 
was no single article that solely used ‘illegal 
immigrants’ to represent the migrants. 
                                                           
4 In this study, I categorized ‚boat people‛ as a 
positive label. I was aware that it might be 
problematic to categorize ‚boat people‛ as a positive 
label since in developed countries, it has negative 
connotation. However, for Indonesians, ‚boat people‛ 
shows the plight of the forced migrants that had to 
leave their country on an unsafe vessels and with 
limited resources. Therefore, it evoked local people’s 
sympathy. 
Instead ‘illegal immigrants’ was always 
used together with a positive label like 
‘refugees’ (See Table 3 for details). 
In contrast, the uses of labels 
dramatically changed in the second time 
span; negative labels dominated the major 
print media´s representation of the transit 
forced migrants. The ‘illegal immigrants’ 
label appeared in 60 percent of all news 
samples, while the combination of positive 
labels – ‘refugees’, ‘asylum seekers’, and 
‘mix positive’ – appeared only in 5 percent 
of the samples (see Table 3). 
Changing Themes 
The content analysis also scrutinizes 
the way transit forced migrants were 
discussed in the media reports. In this 
study, the unit of analysis was at the level of 
an actor´s statement. Each actor´s statement 
in a report was coded only once. In total, 
there were 209 statements coded from 93 
articles in the period of Indochinese 
refugees and 278 statements coded from 123 
articles in the second period. The number of 
statements is the same as the number of 
actors making the statement. 
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Table 3. Representations of Transit Forced Migrants in Indonesian Print Media 
Labels Indochinese (1975-1996) Post-Indochinese (1997-2013) 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Refugees 67 72 2 2 
Mix positive 14 15 3 2 
Mix positive-negative 8 9 40 33 
Fugitive 2 2 0 0 
Boat people 2 2 0 0 
Illegal Immigrants 0 0 74 60 
Immigrants 0 0 2 2 
Mix negative 0 0 1 1 
Asylum seekers 0 0 1 1 
Total 93 100 123 100 
N = 216 
Table 4. Themes of Transit Forced Migrants Discussion 
Themes Indochinese 
 
Post-Indochinese 
Frequency (%) Frequency (%) 
Non-Security 186 89 41 15 
Security 22 11 179 64 
Non-conclusive 1 0 58 21 
Grand Total 209 100 278 100 
 
Table 4 shows that the themes of the 
statements in the two timespans were very 
different. In the period of Indochinese 
refugees, the non-security theme was 
dominant, contributing to 89 percent of 209 
statements. This theme incorporates 
discussion on the plight of refugees, living 
conditions, and solutions. In contrast, in the 
time span of the new generation of forced 
migrants, the security issue dominated the 
statements, with the frequency of 64 percent 
of 278 statements. The non-security themes 
dropped to 15 percent. 
Changing Actors 
Regarding the actors who made the 
statements, the Indonesian government 
officials appeared most frequently within 
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both time spans. In the period of the 
Indochinese refugees’ arrivals, the 
government officials’ statements 
contributed to 48.3 percent of 209 
statements. Various international actors 
appeared at 28.7 percent. The category of 
‘refugees’ statements’ was in the third place 
with 11 percent (see Table 5). The 
domination of the government officials 
increased significantly in the second 
timespan. In the period of the new waves of 
forced migrants, the Indonesian 
government officials contributed to 70 
percent of the overall statements (see Table 
6). In this time span, the presence of 
international actors reduced to third place, 
with the forced migrants’ voices increasing 
to the second place. 
 
Table 5. Actors in the Period of Indochinese Refugees Influx 
Actors Total (%) 
Indonesian government 101 48.3 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  43 20.6 
Ministry of Defense/Military 29 13.9 
Local Government 6 2.9 
Police 4 1.9 
President 3 1.4 
Members of parliament 8 3.8 
Ministry of Information 3 1.4 
Other government officials 1 0.5 
Immigration 2 1.0 
Ministry of Social Affairs 1 0.5 
Port authority 1 0.5 
Refugees  23 11.0 
Local people 15 7.2 
International actors 60 28.7 
UNHCR 15 7.2 
Vietnam 11 5.3 
Australia 10 4.8 
The USA 8 3.8 
Others 7 3.3 
ASEAN (collective) 2 1.0 
Malaysia 6 2.9 
IOM 1 0.5 
Media 8 3.8 
Others 2 1.0 
Total 209 100.0 
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Although the statements by the 
Indonesian government were dominant in 
both time spans, there were some shifts in 
sub-categories within the Indonesian 
government category. During the time of 
Indochinese refugees’ arrival, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of 
Defense/Military were the two most 
dominant institutions. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs contributed to 20.6 percent 
of the overall statements, while the Ministry 
of Defense contributed to 13.6 percent. 
These compositions changed drastically in 
the second time span. Those two 
institutions dropped to third and fourth 
place respectively during the time of the 
new waves of forced migrants. Their roles 
were replaced by DGI and INP. The DGI 
voices in the media reached 27.3 percent, 
while the INP contributed to 26.3 percent of 
the overall 278 statements. 
In addition, changes in compositions 
also occurred in the international actors´ 
category. During the Indochinese refugees’ 
arrival, UNHCR, Vietnam, Australia, and 
the USA voiced concerns regarding the care 
of Indochinese refugees. In the period of the 
new waves of forced migrants, the USA’s 
voices disappeared. In contrast, Australia’s 
voices became dominant. 
Table 6. Actors in the Period of Post-Indochinese Refugees 
Actors Total (%) 
Indonesian government 195 70.1 
Immigration 76 27.3 
Police 73 26.3 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  17 6.1 
Ministry of Defense/Military 17 6.1 
Local government 4 1.4 
Members of parliament 2 0.7 
Others government officials 2 0.7 
Port Authority 2 0.7 
President 1 0.4 
Ministry of Social Affairs 1 0.4 
Refugees 33 11.9 
International actors 25 9.0 
Australia 11 4.0 
UNHCR 7 2.5 
IOM 5 1.8 
Others international actors 2 0.7 
Local people 7 2.5 
Media 7 2.5 
Academician/experts 6 2.2 
Others 4 1.4 
Smugglers 1 0.4 
Total 278 100.0 
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Discussion 
Using media content analysis, this 
study has identified different 
representations of the transit forced 
migrants in Indonesia within two different 
time spans. They were labeled differently 
and the themes of the discussions also 
changed. Those changes led to one major 
question: why were the Indochinese 
refugees portrayed with positive labels and 
were discussed in non-security theme, 
while the newer generations of forced 
migrants were represented with negative 
labels and thus framed as security threats? 
The theoretical framework chapter has 
provided tools for answering the question. 
Referring to Buzan et al.’s (1998) spectrum 
of public issues, this paper can argue that 
the different representations were because 
of the issues being situated at different 
points of the spectrum. 
During the Indochinese refugees’ 
arrival, transit forced migrants were 
allegedly situated in the zone of a 
politicized issue. In contrast, the issue of the 
new generation of forced migrants was in 
the process of moving from the politicized 
zone to the securitized zone. This section 
will further establish empirical evidence to 
support these arguments. The issue of the 
Indochinese refugees was discussed widely 
in the print media, and thus, the 
government regulated the migrants (Buzan 
et al., 1998). In 1979, the Indonesian 
government established a refugee 
processing camp in Galang Island. Within 
the same year, the Indonesian President 
Suharto issued a Presidential Decree 
Number 38/1979 concerning the 
Coordination for Solving the Vietnamese 
Refugees Problem in Indonesia (Keputusan 
Presiden RI 38/1979). The decree becomes 
the only presidential decree to regulate 
international refugees transiting in 
Indonesia (Taylor & Rafferty-Brown, 2010, 
p. 144). 
Content analysis in the previous 
sections has shown that in the period of the 
Indochinese forced migrants, almost 90 
percent of the samples show the use of 
positive labels towards the migrants. In 
addition, about 89 percent of 209 statements 
made by the actors in the samples of news 
articles can be grouped into the category of 
non-security issues. It means that even 
though the issue was debated in the public 
sphere, the migrants were not securitized. 
Graph 1 shows that almost 60 percent out of 
186 statements with the non-security theme 
in the period of Indochinese forced 
migrants’ arrivals discussed refugees in 
relation to an effort to solve the problem. 
This theme includes the establishment of a 
refugee processing camp, their resettlement, 
repatriation, and international cooperation 
in handling refugees. The second most 
common theme was the humanity theme 
incorporating the living condition of the 
forced migrants, the refugees´ plight while 
in the journey to Indonesia, the refugees´ 
basic needs, and their waiting time in 
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Indonesia. The opportunistic behavior of 
refugees5 was in third place. 
The newer generations of forced 
migrants that came from Middle Eastern 
countries and South Asian countries were 
labeled mainly with negative terms, such as 
‚illegal immigrants‛. Labeling transit forced 
migrants as ‚illegal migrants‛ cannot be 
separated from states’ efforts to govern 
migration as it is not only a matter of 
categorizations (Scheel & Squire, 2014) – it 
represents an underlying way of the states’ 
thinking that inevitably contributes to why 
the refugees and asylum seekers are 
handled through tougher measures. 
Furthermore, the previous section shows 
that 64 percent of 278 statements in the 
period of post-Indochinese refugees’ 
arrivals discussed refugees along with 
security concerns. 
In arguing that these changes serve 
as signs that the issue has been securitized, 
it is necessary to answer the following 
questions (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995): 
What existential threats are associated with 
the transit forced migrants? Who are the 
actors? What extraordinary measures are 
available to deal with the threats? In 
regards to threats and extraordinary 
measures, this study, as mentioned in the 
theoretical chapter, also takes into account 
                                                           
5 This theme of opportunistic behavior was not 
categorized under ‘security issues’ because it was 
mainly statements from the Vietnamese authority 
saying that the refugees fled their country due to their 
failure to adapt with the communism’ style of life. It 
was not considered a threat for Indonesians who are 
also against the communist ideology. 
the argument which states that forced 
migrants do not need to be directly referred 
to as threats, but to associate them with 
traditional or transnational crimes 
(Huysmans, 2000; Hammerstad, 2014). 
Graph 2 provides empirical evidence 
for the aforementioned argument. 
Approximately 57 percent of 179 statements 
– categorized as security theme – discussed 
the migrants along with a transnational 
crime theme. The crimes include people 
smuggling, human trafficking, and drugs 
trafficking. The second security issue 
associated with forced migrants was the 
illegal status of their presence in Indonesia. 
About 25.7 percent of the statements 
contributed to this discussion. In total, those 
two threats contribute to 148 of 179 
statements. In general, the transnational 
crimes and the illegal statuses of migrants 
can be categorized under traditional 
physical threats (Innes, 2010). 
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Graph 1. Details in Non-security issue, Indochinese Refugees’ Arrivals 
 
 
Graph 2. Threats Associated to Transit Forced Migrants 
 
 
However, the societal and economic 
threats that appeared quite frequently in 
developed countries (Innes, 2010) evidently 
are not the case in Indonesia. It can be due 
to the fact that Indonesia is a very diverse 
nation consisting of hundreds of ethnicities, 
languages, and cultures. All of those 
ethnicities are united by the political 
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ideology of Pancasila6 – the five principles – 
that also includes the idea of 
multiculturalism. In a sense, there is no 
homogenous identity of ‘being Indonesian’ 
that might be harmed by the presence of 
these forced migrants in transit. 
Furthermore, the economic threat is 
apparently insignificant because of two 
reasons. First, the basic needs of the forced 
migrants are provided by international 
organizations such as IOM and UNHCR – 
not by the Indonesian government. Second, 
while waiting in Indonesia, the refugees 
and asylum seekers are not allowed to 
work, which means that they cannot 
compete in the local job market (Peraturan 
Direktur Jenderal Imigrasi IMI-
1489.UM.08.05, 2010). 
Regarding the actors who make the 
securitizing moves, Huysmans (2000, p. 
758) argues that in the European Union 
context, the securitization of migration 
includes ‚multiple actors such as national 
governments, grass roots, European 
transnational police network, and the 
media‛. I, too, agree that securitization is a 
complex process. Therefore, it might be 
problematic to refer the actors of the 
securitization of migration to particular 
persons or institutions. However, the 
                                                           
6 Pancasila is the Indonesian national ideology 
consisting of five principles, respectively: (1) belief in 
one God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) Indonesian 
unity, (4) democracy under the wise guidance of 
representative consultations (5) social justice for all the 
peoples of Indonesia.  I borrowed a translation of the 
five principles from Encyclopedia Britannica 
http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/440932/
Pancasila  
empirical materials of this study provide 
evidence that INP and DGI7 were the two 
dominant securitizing actors, making the 
most frequent statements in the media (see 
Table 6). Moreover, Table 7 shows those 
two actors were mainly giving statements 
concerning the illegality of transit forced 
migrants’ statuses and other statements that 
linked transit forced migrants with 
transnational crimes. In total, those two 
institutions contributed to 104 statements of 
the overall 148 statements referring to 
transnational crimes and illegal statuses of 
the migrants. 
Police and Immigration officials gain 
legitimacy in securitizing the issue due to 
their nature of being ‚specialized agencies‛ 
(Watson, 2009) or ‚security professional‛ 
(Huysmans, 2000). According to Watson, 
their main audiences – who need to be 
convinced on the nature of the threats and 
the solutions that need to be taken – are 
‚the governing elites‛ (Watson, 2009, p. 20). 
In that sense, their statements in the media 
shall be understood as not to get public 
approval of the securitizing move, but 
rather, they will be seen as part of 
‚symbolic measures‛ (Bigo, 1998, p. 158) in 
order to establish an image that they have 
done something to handle the refugees´ 
issue, although they do not have to 
                                                           
7 INP and DGI consist of various individual actors 
from national, provincial, and district levels. The 
reason for lumping them together as actors at the 
institutional level is due to the chain of command 
nature of those two institutions. It is unlikely for 
police officials to show dissenting opinion about 
transit forced migrants against their institutional 
policy.  
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necessarily solve the problem. In other 
words, the aim is to gain ‚moral support‛ 
from the public, while they achieve ‚formal 
support‛ from the elites (Balzacq, 2005, p. 
184). 
 
Table 7. Actors and the Security Framing of Transit Forced Migrants 
Actors Total Percentage 
Police 58 55.8% 
Transnational crimes          48          46.2% 
Illegality status          10            9.6% 
Immigration 46 44.2% 
Transnational crimes          19          18.3% 
Illegality status          27          26.0% 
Total 104 100.0% 
 
The arguments thus relate to the 
extraordinary measures they offer. In Graph 
3, from 179 statements on threats associated 
with transit forced migrants, the vast 
majority offer no concrete solutions. In 
addition, 22.9 percent suggest severe law 
enforcement as a way to deal with the 
threats. This includes investigation into the 
smuggling cases and also the idea to 
increase punishment for people who are 
involved in the smuggling process. The idea 
of severe punishment has been 
implemented after the Indonesian 
government issued a revision of the 
Immigration Law in 2011. People who are 
involved in the smuggling process, whether 
‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ can be convicted to 
5 to 15 years in prison (Article 120 of Law 
Number 6 of 2011,). The law has a massive 
impact on refugees and asylum seekers in 
transit in Indonesia. With the new 
regulation, any kind of assistance given in 
connection with an alleged people-
smuggling network can lead to 
imprisonment. 
This part has offered securitization 
as an explanation to understand the 
different representations of transit forced 
migrants in Indonesian print media within 
the two timespans. Yet, the argument still 
has a big ‚hole‛. Immediate questions 
would be revolving around: why were the 
Indochinese refugees not securitized? And 
why were the new generations of refugees 
securitized? 
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Graph 3. Solutions Offered to Handle the Migrants’ Threats 
 
 
Even though the Copenhagen 
School is clear in providing the 
operationalization framework on the 
process of securitization, they fail to offer a 
comprehensive tool to analyze the reasons 
why an issue is securitized, while other 
issues are not. Further analysis using 
additional theoretical guidance other than 
securitization theory is needed to scrutinize 
the actors’ decision to securitize or not to 
securitize the migrants. In this context, 
studies conducted by Karyotis (2012) can be 
useful. He argues that the motivation of 
actors to securitize or not to securitize 
transit forced migrants can be explained 
through the notions of subconscious drives 
and cost-benefit calculations. 
Additional reading towards the 
materials using the concepts of 
subconscious drives and cost-benefit 
calculations, combined with some domestic 
and global political constellations, might 
provide some possible explanations. The 
materials suggest that the decision to not 
securitize the Indochinese forced migrants 
was to provide a good image of Indonesia 
in the international community after the 
Indonesian military invasion of East Timor 
in 1976. Ever since the invasion, Indonesia 
had been seen by the international 
community as an abuser of human rights.  
In addition, it was also intended to 
attract resources and maintain legitimacy, 
which was possible because it corresponded 
to the global perception of the forced 
migrants. During the 1970’s the 
international community showed 
willingness to provide financial aids as well 
as to accept refugees. The subconscious 
drive was allegedly connected to the hatred 
of communism in Indonesia after the 1965 
failed coup, for which the communist party 
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was accused of being the mastermind 
behind it. Therefore, the Indochinese 
refugees were seen as the victims of the 
communist regime in Vietnam that deserve 
assistance from Indonesians. 
The next generations of forced 
migrants coming to Indonesia had no 
connection to communist regimes. In 
addition, the experiences of handling the 
Indochinese refugees contributed to the 
understanding that following a ‘soft’ 
approach might cost too much while 
securitizing the migrants can instead attract 
more resources. Again, this was in line with 
global or regional perceptions on the issue 
of forced migration. States have been more 
reluctant to accept forced migrants. 
Additionally, securitizing forced migrants 
can also serve to maintain legitimacy by 
showing to the public that the government 
conducted harsh policies to deal with the 
aliens. Still, these plausible explanations 
need to be explored more. 
Conclusion 
Drawing upon the Indonesian case, 
the paper shows how the representations of 
transit forced migrants at the time of 
Indochinese refugees in 1975-1996 were 
remarkably different compared to that of 
the new generations of refugees from 
Middle Eastern and South Asian countries 
that came to Indonesia in 1997-2013. The 
former were portrayed with positive labels 
and discussed with a non-security 
approach, whereas the latter, by contrast, 
were framed as a security threat. I have 
shown the different portrayals of forced 
migrants using media content analysis on 
216 articles from Indonesian major print 
media. This paper thus places the different 
media portrayals within the spectrum of 
public issues from the Copenhagen School. 
This paper establishes the argument that the 
Indochinese refugees were situated as a 
politicized issue, but they were not 
securitized. Therefore, the portrayals of 
refugees at that time were still positive. 
Even though they were considered a 
humanitarian burden, they were not framed 
as threats. In contrast, the new generations 
of forced migrants were shown as being 
lumped together with transnational crimes. 
They were also often labeled as ‘illegal 
immigrants’. In this sense, I argue that the 
issue had been securitized. 
Even though this paper has tried to 
answer not only ‚how‛ the issue was 
portrayed differently but also ‚why‛ it was 
portrayed differently, further research is 
still necessary. The ‚why‛ aspect is still 
worth scrutinizing more by exploring the 
reasons why the actors decided to not 
securitize Indochinese migrants and 
decided to securitize new waves of forced 
migrants. At the end of the discussion part, 
this paper suggests possible explanations by 
exploring domestic and global political 
constellations. However, the arguments still 
need to be explored more using different 
theory and methods. 
One of the weaknesses this paper 
appears to have is that it has not been able 
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to dig deeper on the implications of moving 
the issue from the realm of a politicized 
issue into the realm of a securitized issue. 
Did it actually solve the problem – or was 
the securitization of forced migration only a 
‚symbolic‛ gesture? Only through further 
research can we gain more knowledge by 
answering this question. In addition, this 
study only divides the period of over 30 
years into two-time spans simplifying the 
complex nature of media representations. 
However, in each timespan, there were also 
different dynamics, which cannot simply be 
explained through the spectrum of the 
public issue. For example, the label that was 
generally used in the period of 1975-1996 
was consistent, with almost no mention of 
‚illegal immigrants‛.  However, in the 
1990’s the way it was discussed was a little 
different, with more emphasis on 
repatriation efforts. 
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